We study the e¤ect of the integration in interbank markets on the interest rates that are charged on bank loans granted to individual …rms. We account for the selection that arises in the loan request and approval process and for banking sector competition. We use a comprehensive data set that contains contract terms on individual loans to more than 7,000 …rms across 12 European countries between 1998:01 and 2005:06. We …nd that interbank market integration results in substantially lower loan rates. The decrease is strongest in markets with competitive banking sectors.
Introduction
Financial integration is widely perceived to be a tool in stimulating investment-based growth through a reduction in the cost of equity, bond, and bank …nance. The euro area has been a prime example of …nancial integration following the introduction of the common currency. Various estimates put the resulting increase in GDP between 0:3% and 2% (see, for example, "Quanti…cation of the Macro-Economic Impact of EU Financial Integration" by London Economics). Around one third of this increase can be attributed to the reduction in the cost of bank …nance. But little is known about the combined e¤ects of banking market integration and competition on bank loan pricing. Our paper …lls this gap. It also contributes to a growing empirical literature that analyzes the determinants of international …nancial integration (Lane and Milessi-Ferretti [2008] ) and its e¤ects on economic growth ( , cross-country correlations in GDP growth (Imbs [2004] ) and consumer welfare (Fecht, Grüner and Hartmann [2007] ).
How does the integration of banking markets -the interbank markets in particulara¤ect the interest rates on business loans? 1 Theory suggests that interbank market integration increases the availability and reduces the cost of bank loans granted to …rms through three di¤erent channels. Interbank market integration: 1) increases the competition to supply bank loans, 2) reduces the cost of external funding for banks, and 3) allows for greater diversi…cation of risk. As the interbank market provides banks ready access to short-and long-term loans to …nance their own investment operations and cushion liquidity shocks, interbank market integration allows banks 1 Interbank market integration may have an impact that is independent of cross-border bank ownership. Demyanyk, Ostergaard and Sorensen [2007] for example …nd that the deregulation of the US banking sector a¤ected the income insurance of small business owners without any signi…cant multistate cross-ownership of banks.
to o¤er more and/or cheaper …nancing. The secured interbank market further allows for diversi…cation without the risk of cross-regional …nancial contagion -under the condition that banks report their liquidity needs truthfully (Fecht, Grüner and Hartmann [2007] ). Interbank market integration can therefore increase the bene…ts of integrating the retail banking markets (that occurs through cross-border lending and/or bank mergers). The more favorable conditions at which banks will borrow and share risks in principle should result in better loan terms for all …rms.
At the same time, it is not clear whether the bene…ts of interbank market integration are enhanced or diminished by credit market competition. Competition lowers the surplus banks can extract from their borrowers and speeds up interest rate adjustments (Klein [1971] ; Monti [1972] ; Herrmann and Jochen [2003] ). In concentrated (and uncontested) markets the few operating banks may be slow to pass the decline in market interest rates to their clients for example. If competition is …erce banks are forced to react quickly not to lose market share. Interbank market integration may therefor a¤ect bank loan terms more rapidly and substantially.
Competition and therefor integration may not bene…t all …rms at all times however. Petersen and Rajan [1995] for example argue that banks are more likely to …nance opaque, i.e., small or young, …rms for example when credit markets are concentrated because banks can then internalize the bene…ts of assisting the …rms. International …nancial liberalization may therefore lead to a deterioration in the credit conditions for small …rms. Moreover integration in interbank markets need not naturally arise. Freixas and Holthausen [2005] for example show that -when banks need to cope with liquidity shocks by borrowing or by liquidating assets -an equilibrium with market integration does not always exist and that integration may even coexist with segmentation.
Our paper contributes to this literature by estimating the combined e¤ect of in-terbank market integration and credit market competition on bank loan rates. We construct measures of both the degree and speed at which yields in all national interbank markets converge relative to yields in our benchmark market Germany. We then estimate the e¤ect of convergence on bank loan rates accounting for the structure of the banking sector. While interbank market integration and market rates per se are strongly correlated, we show that even when the structure of the sector is accounted for, integration exhibits strong real e¤ects.
Business loans are only observed when …rms apply for credit and banks grant it.
Most studies analyzing the e¤ect of market conditions on bank loan terms ignore this sequential selection process. 2 In contrast we account for the loan application and granting decision by estimating a double selection model. Our dataset contains detailed information on …rms that did not apply for bank loans and information on …rms that applied but were denied bank loans. Heckman [1979] shows that this observed information on all …rms can be used to eliminate the bias induced by the left-truncation of the sample. Hence, while we are mostly interested in the loan terms for the group of …rms that seek and obtain bank loans, we are able to eliminate the speci…cation error bias of the double sample selection process by incorporating information from the other groups of …rms in our estimation.
We focus on a sample of more than 7; 000 …rms from 12 countries between Janu- [2008] use aggregate data to estimate the e¤ect of credit market competition on market rate pass-through. These studies do not account for individual …rm and loan characteristics. Degryse, Kim and Ongena [2009] review studies that employ individual loan contract data to assess the impact of banking market competition on bank loan rates. in euro area countries was indeed almost complete at the beginning of the period).
We …nd that interbank market integration decreases the loan rates charged to …rms both in a statistically signi…cant and economically relevant way. Starting from mean integration and loan rates, a country that would double its measure of integration for example would decrease the loan rate by up to 75 basis points. And if a euro zone country in the sample would return to the degree of interbank market integration in the last year prior to joining the euro, loan rates would be, ceteris paribus, 160 basis points higher. However, these results only hold in countries with a considerable degree of credit market competition.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains our empirical strategy.
Section 3 describes the construction of our measure of interbank market integration. Section 4 summarizes the country-level (measures of credit market competition and interbank market rates) and …rm-level data (individual bank loans and …rm characteristics). Section 5 presents the empirical evidence. And …nally Section 6 concludes.
The Empirical Model
The demand for any asset can be derived in a general portfolio choice model in which …rms maximize their expected pro…ts subject to a lifetime budget constraint. The supply of an asset can be derived from pro…t maximization by banks -subject to the constraint that the sum of assets and liabilities does not exceed net worth -accounting for the degree of competition. Dicks-Mireaux and King [1982] and Cox and Japelli [1993] for example estimate the demand for credit, whereby the equilibrium …rm debt is modelled conditional on the holding of some (positive amount of) debt and whereby …rms are unconstrained in the credit markets. The supply of funds is not explicitly modeled in these papers. We model the parameters of the observed bank loans conditional on …rms holding positive debt and being unconstrained. We control for …rm characteristics and account for the borrowing and lending conditions that banks face in interbank markets as well as for the structure of the banking sector.
We employ a three-equation generalized Tobit model. We assume that loan rates, Y it , which are observable to us, are a linear function of …rm i variables X i and country j variables Z j at time t:
" 1ijt is a random component which varies at the …rm, country and time level that is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2 1 . Y it is observed only if the demand for debt is positive and the …rm is not credit constrained.
Let the dummy variable Q equals 1 if the …rm desires positive debt and equals zero otherwise. The value of Q is in turn determined by the latent variable:
where X 2it contains the values of X 1it and other supplementary variables that may e¤ect the …rm's …xed costs and convenience associated with using bank credit. The variable Q = 1 if q > 0 and Q = 0 otherwise. The error " 2it is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
Bank loan rates are only observable when …rms actually receive loans. Implicitly the model assumes that a loan is received if the …rm needs a loan, applies for it and the …rm is not rejected by the bank (i.e., the …rm is not credit constrained). Equation (2) addresses the …rst part of this condition but not the second. Some …rms may need to have a strictly positive amount of bank debt but are constrained in their access to bank …nancing. We assume that such credit constraints take the form of a binary constraint which is …rm-speci…c. BEEPS makes it possible to directly estimate that constraint as the survey asks …rms about their reasons for not applying and their experience in general with bank loans. Constraints on obtaining credit may be a function of …rm and bank characteristics. As we do not observe the lending bank, we employ characteristics of the country's banking sector as a proxy.
We de…ne a …rm to be credit constrained if it needs credit but has no bank loan.
If the …rm obtains a bank loan, it is unconstrained. Unlike studies on consumer debt which are interested in the di¤erence between desired and actual debt (Hayashi [1985] ; Cox and Japelli [1993] ), we are mainly interested in the loan rate, accounting for other loan terms such as maturity and collateral. Hence, we de…ne a dummy variable C which equals 1 if the …rm is unconstrained and equals 0 otherwise. The latent variable for C depends on the determinants of desired credit:
X 3ijt is a vector of …rm-level variables that may determine the demand for debt and proxies for the time-variant relevant characteristics of the banking sector. C = 1 if c > 0, and C = 0 otherwise. The error " 3ijt is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance Now that we have de…ned the selection criteria, there are four distinct regimes speci…ed by the latent variables q and c: constrained …rms that do not need bank credit (Q = 0; C = 0), constrained …rms that do (Q = 1; C = 0), unconstrained …rms that choose to hold no bank credit (Q = 0; C = 1) and unconstrained …rms with (positive) bank credit (Q = 1; C = 1). The estimation strategy follows Heckman [1979] . We use the observed information for all …rms in order to eliminate the bias induced by the left-truncation of our sample to …rms that need and obtain bank credit. Hence, while it is the latter group that we are interested in, we incorporate information from the …rst three groups to eliminate the speci…cation error bias induced by this sample selection.
The expectation of the cost of bank credit for the fourth group of …rms is:
Using the distribution of the error terms de…ned above and the standard probit normalization (
, one can obtain consistent estimates of and up to a factor of proportionality. Let 12 and 13 indicate the simple correlation between " 1 and " 2 and between " 1 and " 3 , respectively. Hence, the …nal estimation procedure employed can be written as: are the inverse Mill's ratios (Heckman [1979] ). The probability of being in the sample of observed loans is (q) (c).
Next, we specify the model in terms of our variables of interest. The equation of the desired debt contains …rm variables which contain information about how likely it is that the …rm will need debt: ownership structure (individual/family, state/government or domestic/foreign ownership), ownership history (privatized or originally private if not government owned), whether the …rm exports, whether the …rm receives subsidies from any branch of government, and whether it is subject to an annual external audit or not. We also use a proxy for …rm size where the …rm is de…ned as small if it has less than 50 employees, medium if it has between 50 and 250 employees, and large if it has more than 250 employees. Finally, year and country dummies are included to account for the possibility that desired bank credit is a function of (time-varying) macroeconomic and (constant) country characteristics.
The reduced form model for being unconstrained contains the same set of variables, but it also includes a proxy for whether the …rm uses external auditing by a certi…ed agency. It also includes variables which measure bank ownership and competition, namely, the share of banking sector assets held by foreign …rms, and the degree of banking sector concentration.
3 Measuring Interbank Market Integration Scitovski [1969] was the …rst to formulate a comprehensive de…nition of …nancial markets integration by pointing out that "the perfect integration of asset markets means [...] that the asset must be transferable and the portfolio preferences of individual asset holders are regionally unbiased" (op. cit., p. 89). Building upon that formulation, …nancial integration in general and interbank market integration in particular can be de…ned using two broad criteria: the volume of transactions and the e¢ ciency of the markets (Obstfeld [1986] ). 3 In this paper, we choose as a proxy for interbank market integration a measure à la Engle and Granger [1979] , namely, the measures of the co-integration between rates in domestic interbank markets and rates in a benchmark market, i.e., Germany.
Given that we want to compute the level of integration in di¤erent subperiods over a longer period, the simplest possible model that can be estimated is:
r j t represent the nominal yield to maturity observed on a daily basis at time t for 3 Measuring the volumes of transactions has an innate appeal. But a smaller number of international …nancial transactions does not automatically imply market segmentation, if integration makes domestic and foreign investments equivalent for investors. On the other hand, capital ‡ight in response to monetary and/or …nancial distress is hardly a sign of deepening integration (Herrmann and Jochem [2003] ). Measures of …nancial integration based on the law of one price are therefor preferred. country j and r b t represents the yield to maturity at time t for the benchmark German asset. In integrated markets, common shocks will be diversi…ed away, prices are mainly driven by common factors, and hence the co-integration parameter will be positive, and equal to 1. Working with nominal rather that real rates should be of no concern as with increasing coordination of monetary policy and real macroeconomic convergence, …nancial integration implies convergence in both nominal and real yields. The problem with this simple approach is that the resulting time series of j t 's for each country i will have serially correlated standard errors, resulting in in ‡ated tstatistics. This is problematic given that the j t 's will be used as explanatory variables in the second stage where we study the e¤ect of interbank sector integration on loan rates. For this reason, we employ a di¤erent speci…cation, namely:
In this case the estimates are computed over the full time series for each country instead of in the rolling windows. This speci…cation allows for a time-varying Formally, we estimate the model in Equation (7) as well as the model:
t is the di¤erence in adjacent daily yields for country j and r b t is the di¤erence in adjacent daily yields for the benchmark country Germany. Thus, Equation (7) re ‡ects the long-run equilibrium adjustment, while Equation (8) 
Data

Interbank market integration indicators
To compute our main proxy for interbank market integration we employ interbank nominal yields on 1-, 3-and 6-month money market instruments from the Global The developments in the yields on 1-month and 3-month instruments have been very similar.
Firm-level data
We match the data on interbank market rates from the Global Financial database The survey also tried to achieve representativeness in terms of the size of …rms it surveyed: between two thirds and three quarters of the …rms surveyed are "small" (less than 50 workers) and around 10% of the …rms surveyed are "large" (more than 250 workers). 4 Table 1 provides summary statistics on the number of …rms and their size distribution by country.
Although the dataset is almost purely cross-sectional (for each …rm answers are averaged over the period of the survey), there is a time dimension in the data on bank loans. Indeed, each …rm is asked about the cost, maturity, currency denomination, and the time it took to negotiate the last bank loan -if any -as well as about the exact month and year in which the loan was received. Firms report to have received loans between January 1998 and June 2005. On the basis of this information we construct a synthetic panel covering 90 months. We then match this panel to our measures of …nancial integration. These measures are calculated as in Equations (7) and (8) from daily yields in the Global Financial database. The j t 's are then averaged for each month to give 90-month series. 2; 318 of the non-German …rms in the dataset obtained a loan during this period. 5 Firms with outstanding bank credit provide many details on their most recent loan.
Most important for our purposes, BEEPS includes information on the annualized cost of the loan. The survey further covers loan duration and collateralization (as a proportion of the loan amount). We focus on the loan rate and calculate the "real" rate as the spread between the nominal rate of the loan and the nominal yield on a German 6-month money market instrument in the same year:month. Table 2 provides the sample summary statistics by country for the most relevant loan characteristics.
We exclude all observations for which loans were received earlier than January 1998.
In the remaining sample, the real average annualized rate of loans is 5:7%, ranging were the main reasons?" We classify …rms as having no need for bank credit those choosing in 47b the answer "Does not need a loan" and …rms as credit constrained those marking in 47a the answers "Because the application was turned down" or in 5 Remember that Germany is excluded from the regression analysis as the benchmark country.
47b "Application procedures for banks are too burdensome", "Collateral requirements for bank loans are too strict", "Interest rates are too high", "It is necessary to make informal payments to get bank loans", or "Did not think it would be approved". This strategy of grouping …rms that were turned down and …rms that were discouraged from applying is also employed in Cox and Jappelli (1993) and is standard in studies that rely on detailed questionnaires. We further use country-level variables to account for the e¤ect of interbank market integration. The propensity of banks to grant credit and the loan rate will depend on the o¢ cial money market rates. For this reason, we include the contemporaneous monthly nominal rate in all regressions.
Finally, our second main variable of interest, banking sector concentration, is taken from the 2008 update of Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine [2000] . Concentration is only available at a yearly frequency. Table 3 summarizes interbank market integration, foreign ownership of bank assets, and banking sector concentration averaged over the period 1998 to 2005 for the 13 countries in the dataset. While foreign ownership of bank assets is very low in Slovenia (17%), 6 it is above 50% in the rest of the sample countries, with a maximum of 97% in Estonia. Estonia also boasts the highest banking sector concentration (98% of banking sector assets are held by the 5 largest banks), while the most competitive banking environment is found in Poland (42%). There is some correlation between foreign ownership and concentration in the commercial banking sector (0:37).
Empirical Results
We estimate a simple model of the e¤ect of interbank market integration on business loan rates. First, in a basic model, we do not account for credit market competition and estimate the following version of Equation (5):
LR ijt is the real loan rate, i.e., the spread over the nominal benchmark money market rate, on a loan granted to …rm i in country j at time t, In the main model of interest, we also account for the degree of competition in the banking sector. We de…ne BC j as the share of banking sector assets held by the 5 largest banks in country j. Formally, the model becomes:
As in the previous model, the estimator of interest is 1 . In the empirical exercise,
we proxy banking sector concentration as dummies which equal 1 (0) if the country during this time period is in the bottom (top) half of the bank concentration distribution. Again, we expect the sign of 1 to be positive for the composite term with the dummy for low banking sector concentration. Table 4 reports the within-country and panel unit root tests for benchmark and country-speci…c interbank market rates for 6-month instruments (the results are identical when we perform the exercise using the 1-and 3-month instruments). The results indicate non-stationarity of the series at the 5% level for all but 3 countries in the dataset, although for the panel the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected at the 5% level. We also apply the unit root test for the …rst-di¤erence of the rates to test for second-order non-stationarity. The results overwhelmingly reject I(2) and hence, support the conclusion that the rate series are integrated of order 1. Given these …ndings, we proceed to test for co-integration between interbank market rates and the corresponding benchmark rates. Table 5 reports the results for the Engle-Granger co-integration test as applied to the long-run models of the interbank rates. For 7 of the 12 countries, as well as for the full panel series, the hypothesis of no co-integration can be rejected at the 1% con…dence level. Apparently, for some countries the adjustment of the domestic rates is slow and not even a long-run relationship can be detected in the sample. However, the results for the majority of the countries (the euro zone countries plus the three Baltic states) as well as for the full series imply a strong long-run equilibrium relationship between domestic and benchmark rates. Hence we can proceed to construct and use our j t with a strong degree of con…dence. and maximum, although Hungary is the most non-integrated country at the end of the sample period. Table 7 presents the results from the …rst stage probit regression for bank loan need.
Unit roots and co-integration
Selection estimation
The probability of needing bank loans decreases in the size of the …rm and is also lower for government-owned and foreign-owned …rms. The latter companies may face lower costs of internal funding either due to a soft budget constraint in the case of government ownership or to a higher supply of loans in the case of foreign ownership. The need for bank loans is higher for exporters potentially due to their faster expansion. Whether the ownership of the …rm changed hands from the state to the private sector or whether the …rm is subsidized or not doesn't matter for bank loan need. 
Main result
In Table 9 , we report the estimates for Equation (9) that assesses the e¤ect of interbank market integration on real loan rates (the spread between the nominal rate of the loan and the nominal yield on a German 6-month money market instrument in the same year:month). We use the estimate of the degree of convergence in 6-month nominal yields as a proxy for interbank market integration, 7 and do not yet account for the structure of the banking sector. Small …rms face higher loan rates, as expected, while audited …rms and exporters pay lower rates. Longer maturity loans carry lower loan rates. Importantly for us, the estimate of 1 is positive and signi…cant at the 1% level: …rms operating in countries where interbank markets are more integrated face obtain lower loan rates. This result holds in the full sample period and when we drop the most volatile sub-period (1998-2000). The results even holds when we limit the sample to the euro zone countries only. The estimated coe¢ cients then imply that if all euro zone countries were to go back to the degree of interbank market integration in their last year prior to joining the euro zone, 8 loan rates would be ceteris paribus higher by 160 basis points on average and as much as 240 basis points higher in Greece.
Importantly, the sign pattern of the selection terms (when signi…cant) con…rms our intuition and justi…es the application of a procedure correcting for the selection biases. The coe¢ cient on the second selection term in Column (iii) implies a negative correlation between unobservables in the equation for bank loan need and those in the real business loan rate equation. This negative correlation implies that unobserved factors that decrease the real cost of a business loan tend to increase the probability of the need for a bank loan. Excluding the selection term from the equation results in an underestimation of the true e¤ect by around 7%.
We also account for errors-in-variables bias induced by the fact that our measure of interbank markets integration comes from a …rst-stage regression and is thus measured Importantly, our estimates stay signi…cant at the 5% level.
Finally, we account for the possibility that the rates on business loans are reported with an error. It is entirely conceivable that when responding to the question on the loan's annual cost, the company owners misreported the true cost due to faulty records, rounding, or even bad memory. The sample exhibits quite a large variation in the …rst digit after the decimal point, pointing to a relative precision in the answers.
Still, we prefer to account explicitly for measurement error. Our solution is to replace our measure of the real rate on business loans with a dummy equal to 1 if the real rate is bigger than 500 basis points, and to 0 otherwise. As indicated by the results reported in Column (v), this doesn't change the main results, and neither do di¤erent choices for the cutting point of the dummy.
The e¤ect of banking competition
Next, we proceed to investigate the hypothesis that real business loan rates in more competitive banking markets show a stronger response to the long-run integration of interbank markets compared to less competitive markets. Table 10 In all equations, we interact both our measure of interbank market integration and the level of domestic nominal yields on the instruments in question with the dummy for bank concentration. While signi…cant on its own, the interaction term which includes the level of nominal money market rates becomes insigni…cant once the interaction of bank concentration with our measure of integration is included. This implies that the bulk of the e¤ect on real rates is carried by the degree of convergence between domestic and international markets rather than by the nominal yields on assets traded in domestic interbank markets.
We get an e¤ect with the opposite sign when we include an interaction term with a dummy equal to 1 if the country is in the top half of the banking sector concentration distribution, implying that indeed most of the e¤ect recorded in Table 9 is realized in competitive credit markets.
We then proceed to check whether our results on the e¤ects of interbank money markets integration, accounting for banking sector concentration, are a¤ected by the choice of proxy for money markets integration. In Table 11 , we repeat the estimations from Table 10 by replacing the estimate of the degree of integration based on yields on 6-month interbank market instruments with estimates based on 1-and 3-month yields. Both the statistical signi…cance and the economic e¤ect decrease for the shorter maturities. A doubling of the 1-month measure of interbank market integration for example in countries in the lower half of the banking sector concentration distribution leads to a decrease in real average annualized loan cost of "only" 60 basis points.
Firm …nancing patterns
We …nally turn our attention to the e¤ect of interbank market integration on the …nancing patterns of the …rm. Our …nding that interbank market integration has reduced the cost of credit leads us to expect that as a result of integration, …rms will …nance a higher share of their investment from local commercial banks. Naturally, that should come at the expense of substitute forms of external …nance when bank credit is unavailable. Firms are often forced to resort to trade credit when rationed in the credit market (see, for example, Cuñat [2007] ). Empirical studies have found high sensitivity of investment to retained earnings and trade credit (for example, Fazzari et al. [1988] ). Hence, the evidence so far implies that we should see investment being …nanced in larger part from banks and in lesser part from retained earnings and trade credit. Table 12 presents evidence to that e¤ect. We …nd that …rms which received their last businss loan in an environment characterized by deeper interbank market integration …nanced a larger share of their investment in the past 12 months via borrowing from domestic commercial banks, and a lower share of their investment in the past 12 months via trade credit. While the results are only statistically signi…cant at the 10%, they are a logical extension to our previous …ndings.
Conclusion
Integration of money, bond, and equity markets, taking place with great intensity in the euro zone area, motivates our research on the e¤ect of …nancial integration on real business activity. Using direct indicators of corporate needs for bank credit and constraints in obtaining it, we investigate the e¤ect of the integration in interbank markets on real loan rates. We employ a sample of more than 7; 000 …rms from 8 new EU member states and 4 euro zone countries. We construct a measure of the degree of long-run convergence of nominal yields in national interbank markets to yields in the German benchmark interbank market. We account for any selection biases by using information on …rms without bank loans.
Our …ndings imply that interbank market integration substantially cuts loan rates.
For example, if a country had the average sample loan rates and was at the mean of the distribution in terms of interbank market integration, a doubling of our measure of integration would decrease loan rates by 60 to 75 basis points. However, these e¤ects only hold in countries with a considerable degree of credit market competition.
Hence interbank market integration has a pronounced e¤ect on real loan rates and credit market competition has a strong impact on the size of this e¤ect. Market rates are interbank rates on 6-month instruments, and inter-day differences in rates on 6-month instruments. of this test assumes a unit root in the residuals of the cointegration regression, which implies absence of cointegration. The alternative hypothesis assumes a root of less than one. Market rates are interbank rates on 6-month instruments. is the absence of a borrowing constraint. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if the firm is unconstrained, and to 0 otherwise. 'Small firm' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has less than 50 employees. 'Medium firm' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has between 50 and 250 employees. 'Individual owner' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owend by an individual or a family. 'Government owner' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by a government agency. 'Foreign owner' is a dummy equal to 1 if the owner of the firm is a foreign entity. 'Exporter' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm exports to non-local markets. 'Privatized' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a former state-owned company. 'Subsidized' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has received in the last 3 years subsidies from central or local government. Ommited category in firm size is 'Large firm'. Note: Dependent variable is the incidence of a bank loan. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if the firm has a bank loan, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are as in Table 4 . 'Audited' is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is subject to annual independent audit, and 'Bank concentration' measures the share of banking sector assets held by the largest five banks. Ommited category in firm size is 'Large firm'. Note: The dependent variable is the spread of the individual loan rate over the benchmark money market rate (columns (i)-(iiv)) and a dummy equal to 1 if the the spread of the individual loan rate over the benchmark money market is larger than 500 basis points (column (iv)). OLS regressions in columns (i)-(iii) and (v), IV regression in column (iv), where the measure of integration is instrumented for using the 24-month lagged value of domestic nominal interbank yields. t 6 β is the estimate of interbank markets integration for rates on 6-month money instruments at time t from equation (7). '6 month interbank rate' is the nominal rate of 6-month interbank market money instruments. 'Loan maturity' is the duration of the loan. 'Mills1' is the estimate from the borrowing constraint regression (Table 8) . 'Mills2' is the estimate from the loan incidence regression ( Table 7 ). The rest of the variables are as in Tables 7 and 8 . Note: The dependent variable is the share of new investment in the last 12 months financed via borrowing from local private commercial banks (columns (i)-(ii)) and the share of new investment in the last 12 months financed via trade credit from suppliers or from customers (columns (iii)-(iv)). β is the estimate of interbank markets integration for rates on 6-month money instruments at time t from equation (7) . 'Bank concentration low' is a dummy equal to 1 if the country is in the lower half of the bank concentration distribution at time t. The unreported variables are as in Table 9 . 
